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The U.S. Deep Seabed Mining
Regulations: The Legal Basis for
an Alternative Regime
MICHAEL R. MOLITOR*
This article focuses on the jurisdictional limitations established
by United States deep seabed mining legislation. The author con-
tends that by incorporating the ambiguous jurisdictional lan-
guage of earlier international agreements into domestic
legislation, the drafters have missed the opportunity to expand
United States unrestricted access to deep seabed hard minerals.
He proposes that the promotion of continued development of deep
seabed mining technology can be achieved through the legislative
enactment of an Exclusive Economic Zone. Its creation would
place portions of the deep seabed under national jurisdiction that
would have otherwise been excluded.
INTRODUCTION
With the commercial interest in deep seabed hard minerals by
large United States corporations ever growing, Congress passed,
and the President signed into public law, The Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act (Act) in June 1980.1 The Act, as well as
the Regulations which followed, fell well short of achieving their
stated objectives by establishing jurisdictional limitations on the
deep ocean floor that failed to take into account the needs of the
United States deep seabed mining industry. There is now, how-
* Congressional Staff Delegate, United States Delegation to the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. B.AI, 1979, Michigan; M.Sc., 1981,
London School of Economics and Political Science.
1. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 9r-283, 94 Stat.
553 (1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1981)) [hereinafter cited as Act].
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ever, emerging as a part of customary international law, a rela-
tively new juridical concept that, if brought into existence
through legislation, would help to rectify the Act's major short-
coming. This concept would allow deep seabed mining under na-
tional authority and avoid the near complete collapse of
commercial interest in deep seabed mining by United States
corporations.
THE REGULATIONS' HISTORY
If the intent of Congress in introducing the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act was "to promote the orderly development
of hard mineral resources in the deep seabed,"2 as the Act's pre-
amble implies, one would be disappointed to learn that the United
States deep seabed mining industry (industry) has nearly col-
lapsed since the Bills became public law in June 1980. From the
mid-1970's, when commercial interest in the recovery of manga-
nese nodules 4 came to a climax, the advancement of deep seabed
mining technology has been closely linked to the availability of
internal and external project financing5 and the progress of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS III). Attempts to circumvent these realities through the in-
troduction of domestic legislation has had no pronounced effect
upon the nebulous financial and legal climate stifling the indus-
try's attempts to gain access to the deep seabed. There has now
developed a real need to amend the Act as emerging rules of in-
ternational law will soon allow for the establishment of alterna-
tive regimes for the management of ocean space.
When United States corporations6 began allocating millions of
dollars for the development of various deep seabed hard mineral
recovery systems,7 the lucrative appeal of "trillions of tons of
2. H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1979).
3. Id.
4. For a general description of manganese nodules, see Marjoram, Manganese
Nodules and Marine Technology, 7 REsouncEs PoL. 45 (1981).
5. Deep Seabed Mining, Subconm. on Oceanography, Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries 169 (1977) (statement of C. Thomas Houseman, Vice Presi-
dent and Technical Director for Mining, Chase Manhattan Bank) 'the concept of
project financing (within major mining programs) has evolved in recent years.
(It) is a term used to describe a method of financing new ventures under which
lenders make commitments directly to a new project company based primarily
upon projections of future cash flow." Id. at 171.
6. They are: Kennecott (Copper) Corporation, U.S. Steel, Deepsea Ventures,
Inc., Sun Oil Corporation, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., and Standard Oil of
Indiana. See Ford & Gibbons, Whose Nodules are They? 82 NEw SciENSs 631(1979).
7. Smale-Adans & Jackson, Manganese Nodule Mining, 290 Pm. TRANs. R.
Soc. LoND. 125 (1978).
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manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel" 8 lying on the deep ocean
floor justified the requisite expenditures of internal project funds.
As these funds began to dwindle, due largely to gross under-esti-
mations of the cost of developing these systems, it was clear that
the external financing community would soon become involved.
The shrewd response given to the infant industry was that, until
the lending institutions were completely convinced that the in-
dustry had "assured access" 9 to a portion of the deep seabed
large enough to maintain a commercially operative mining ven-
ture for 25 years,O not one red cent would be approved. Whereas
previously, financial considerations were in the limelight, now the
legal status of the deep seabed became the focus of the industry's
attention. This new focus became centered upon UNCLOS EI as
assured access at this point was directly linked to the progress of
this law-making Conference."
At some point in the progress of the industry's attempt to clar-
ify the legal status of the deep seabed, the industry decided that
possibly those entrusted with making the financial decisions con-
cerning the fate of the industry's continued efforts might be per-
suaded to overlook the fact that deep seabed mining was an
international activity to be governed solely by international
rules.' 2 The industry believed that if the United States govern-
ment were to give its legislative approval to deep seabed mining,
then the financial decision-makers might allow the necessary con-
tinued funding. Nothing could have been further from reality.
8. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEEP SEABED MINERALS: RE-
SOURCES, DPLOMAcy, AND STRATEGIC INTEREST 13 (Comm. Print 1978). This large
amount was first postulated by John Mero in his work, MINERAL RESOURCES OF
THE SEA (1965).
9. This term became common usage during the process of the legislation's
hearings and generally refers to internationally recognized legal control over a
portion of the deep seabed.
10. This period of time was calculated as the duration necessary to allow a
mining venture to return an attractive profit. See Takeuchi, Exploitation of Man-
ganese Nodules-Future Problems (a paper presented before the Third Interna-
tional Ocean Symposium (The Deep Seabed and Its Mineral Resources) Tokyo,
1978).
11. As a majority of States agreed that deep ocean mining outside the limits of
national jurisdiction should be authorized only by an international agency to be
established through negotiations at UNCLOS II, it is clear that, at least at this
point, assured access was a subject of great significance at the Conference. U.N.
Declaration of Principles, GA. Res. 2749 (xxv), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 220 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Declaration of Principles]. See also note 47 infra.
12. Id.
The mining lobby3 pushed for and eventually received the Act
which to date has only allowed the industry to barely remain
alive.14
Initially, the Act's legislative precursor, H.R. 2759, provided for
financial guarantees15 which would have protected the industry
from losses incurred within the "Area"16 due to the entry into
force of an incompatible, multilateral law of the sea convention. 7
This international agreement would grant powers to a suprana-
tional body (The International Seabed Authority) which in turn
would control all deep seabed mining activities within the Area.
The guarantees provided for federal monetary compensation to
the industry with which the financial community was partially
satisfied.18 The original form19 of the Bill, introduced in the Sen-
ate by Lee Metcalf, was so significantly altered by the time it ar-
rived at the White House in June 1980 that both the industry and
the lending community soon realized that their extensive lobby-
ing efforts had been undertaken mostly in vain. Their greatest ob-
jection was the complete deletion of all financial guarantees, 20 or
the idea that the United States Government was not in the busi-
ness of underwriting insurance policies to protect the interests of
American citizens in areas where it had no jurisdiction.21
The industry was now faced with some difficult alternatives. Ei-
ther they would wait until UNCLOS I produced an agreement to
13. For practical purposes, this refers only to the American Mining Congress.
14. Personal Communication, Conrad Welling, Senior Vice-President, Ocean
Minerals Company, October 7, 1981.
15. Oversight Hearings on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea Subcomm. on Oceanography, Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) (Statement of Amb. Elliot Richardson) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearings]. On the history of the Act, see Caron, Municipal Leg-
islationfor Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L 259 (1980).
16. "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/L.78, part I, art. 1(1) (28 August 1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
17. Id.
18. See supra note 5, Deep Seabed Mining, (statement of C. Thomas House-
man) at 177.
19. S. 2801, 92d Congress, 2d Sess. (1972).
20. "In our view, the Federal Government should not be required to guarantee
a segment of the private sector against financial losses that may occur from ac-
tions taken by the Federal Government to advance the national interest." See
Oversight Hearing, (Statement of Amb. Richardson), supra note 15, at 4.
21. The Act is very clear on this matter. "DISCLAIMER OF OBLIGATION TO
PAY COMPENSATION... this Act (does) not create or express any legal or
moral obligation on the part of the United States Government to compensate any
person for any impairment of the value of that person's investment in any opera-
tion for exploration or commercial recovery ... which might occur in connection
with the entering into force of an international agreement with respect to the
United States." 30 U.S.C. § 1444 (1980).
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which the United States would or would not become a party,
cease all research and development efforts, or seek an alternative
regime under which mining would establish and maintain assured
access and tenure. Those who followed closely the protracted ef-
forts of the industry would not have to wait long for the industry's
decision.
President Carter signed the Bill into law on June 28, 1980. From
that point, it was the duty of the Department of Commerce to pro-
duce regulations that would encourage the continued develop-
ment of deep seabed mining technology. The Act called for the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce to promulgate
regulations for all exploratory and commercial deep seabed min-
ing activities to be undertaken by United States nationals. The
final Regulations 22 were made public by the Office of Ocean Min-
erals and Energy (OME), an agency of NOAA, in September 1981.
They are lengthy, complex and quite burdensome; certainly not in
the spirit of the current Administration's enunciated policy of fed-
eral deregulation with the intent of promoting business.
Although there are many interesting legal aspects to the Regu-
lations,23 it is the delimitation of the deep seabed and its relation-
ship to the continental shelf that is of chief concern to this
author's comments. It should be noted that United States nation-
als are presently prohibited by the Act to undertake any commer-
cial recovery of deep seabed hard minerals prior to January 1,
1988.24 This provision represents the legal basis for the Act's in-
terim status as "an interim legal regime under which technology
can be developed and the exploration and recovery of the hard
mineral resources of the deep seabed can take place until such
time as a Law of the Sea Treaty enters into force with respect to
the United States."25 This future date, it was felt, would give the
law of the sea negotiations ample time to produce an agreement
for signature and ratification.26 The industry, realizing that the
22. Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses: Final Rules, 46
Fed. Reg. 45,890 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970).
23. Since the Regulations, not the Act, are the source of the limitations placed
upon the industry it would be more appropriate to examine the language of the
former as it applies more directly to the issue in question.
24. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,898 (1981).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1981).
26. 'The Administration would strongly prefer to see ... July 1, 1982 as the
earliest date on which commercial recovery can commence .... The Administra-
commerical recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed was
unrealistic in this decade, had no difficulty accepting this
provision.
At OME, those who were entrusted with the duty of drafting
the Deep Seabed Mining Regulations (Regulations) were forced
to locate precisely which rules of international law governed the
delimitation of the continental shelf and deep seabed with respect
to the United States. The United States ratified the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf27 and the Treaty entered
into force with respect to the United States on June 10, 1964. The
drafters of the Regulations 28 were obligated to incorporate the rel-
evant articles of this agreement within the Regulations' delimita-
tion of the area over which it would have jurisdiction. The
language of article I of the 1958 Convention is duplicated verbatim
within the Regulations:
"Continental Shelf" means-(1) The seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limi to where the depth of the superja-
cent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of such sub-
marine area;29 and (2) The seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas
adjacent to the coast of islands;30
This definition is undeniably ambiguous as it might be argued
that the exploitability criterion 3 ' would allow the technically-ad-
vanced States to claim control over seabed resources well beyond
the geological limits of the continental shelf. The outer delimita-
tion of the continental shelf has been one of the most controver-
sial and difficult issues to resolve at UNCLOS II. Although
general agreement has been reached on article 76(4),32 incorpo-
rating the so called "Irish formula,"33 the method outlined is so
technically oriented and confusing that its success in future appli-
cation must be seriously questioned. This, however, is of little im-
portance to the issue of the Regulations' jurisdiction as neither
tion is deeply committed to the negotiation of an international deep seabed mining
regime. The inclusion of the suggested date... will allow ample time for the law
of the sea negotiations to be concluded ..... Oversight Hearing, supra note 15 at
5. (Statement of Amb. Richardson).
27. Convention on the Continental Shelf done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (1964).
28. The definitions for the continental shelf and the deep seabed were origi-
nally included within the legislation. Act, Sec. 3(2) (3), supra note 1, at 5.
29. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,897 (1981) (Emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. See text accompanying note 29 supra. This phrase is commonly referred
to as the "exploitability criterion."
32. Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 31.
33. For an excellent account of the negotiation for the Irish formula at UN-
CLOS II, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. Irr'. L 227 (1981).
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the Draft Convention nor article 76(4) has yet to find a place in
international law, customary or otherwise.
The ambiguity of the exploitability criterion becomes of great
significance to the uncertain nature of the Regulations' jurisdic-
tional limits when the definition of the deep seabed, the area of
principal concern, is examined. As outlined within the section en-
titled "Definitions":
"Deep seabed" means the seabed, and the subsoil thereof to a depth of
ten meters, lying seaward of and outside-
(1) The Continental Shelf of any nation; and
(2) Any area of national resource jurisdiction of any foreign nation, if
such area extends beyond the Continental Shelf of such nation and such
jurisdiction is recognized by the United States .... 34
If the deep seabed begins where the seaward limit of the conti-
nental shelf terminates and as the latter definition for practical
purposes is undefined, where does the boundary between these
two regions exist? Clearly, as technology will soon permit the
commercial exploitation of the continental slope and rise for oil
and gas and, possibly, hard minerals,35 there is an increasingly
significant need to achieve a workable definition for the outermost
edge of the continental margin. It is the author's opinion, as
stated previously, that article 76(4) of the Draft Convention does
not achieve this practical objective.3 6 The Regulations only add to
34. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,897 (1981). The United Kingdom has avoided the problems
of incorporating the misleading definition of the continental shelf within their
deep seabed mining legislation: "deep seabed means that part of the bed of the
high seas in respect of which sovereign rights in relation to the natural resources
of the seabed are neither exercisable by the United Kingdom nor recognized by
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as being exercisable by an-
other Sovereign Power.... ." Deep Sea Mining Act (Temporary Provisions) 1(6)
(1981) reprinted in 20 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1218 (1981). The Federal Republic of
Germany has been equally innovative: "deep seabed means... the seabed and
its immediate subsoil lying seaward of and outside of areas for which the Federal
Republic of Germany claims sovereign rights or has recognized the sovereign
rights of other states . . . ." Act on Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining,
Sec. 2(4) (1980) reprinted in 19 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1331 (1980).
35. The Department of Interior has recently requested information from
United States citizens and companies interested in leasing portions of the Outer
Continental Shelf for the commercial recovery of hard minerals. See 46 Fed. Reg.
45,820 (1981).
36. The Conferees at UNCLOS III have succeeded in replacing the nebu-
lous (continental shelf) delimitation criteria developed under both the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1969 North Sea Cases
with a different set of vague and impractical criteria... what was needed
seven years ago and what is needed today is a single precise method of
delimitation rooted in data subject to practical implementation.
the confusion by employing the very misleading language of the
1958 agreement.
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AS AN ALTERNATIVE
There is now, however, emerging as a part of customary inter-
national law a relatively new concept which would assist in cir-
cumventing the problems associated with the boundary between
the continental shelf and the deep seabed. The Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ)37 is a product of the negotiations at UNCLOS
I and has nearly found its place within the rules of customary
international law.38 Although the Draft Convention, of which the
EEZ is a part, as of yet does not represent universally accepted
international law, many States have incorporated the language of
the Convention within their unilateral, bilateral and, to some ex-
tent, regional legislative efforts.39 The process by which this exer-
cise in State practice is transformed into customary international
law4o was outlined by the International Court of Justice in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases41 and includes four distinct
but interdependent requirements.42 It is not the author's intent to
discuss this process but to point out that many legal writers agree
that the EEZ will soon achieve, if it has not already, customary
status regardless of the outcome of UNCLOS 111.43 That is to say,
the four well recognized requirements necessary for the forma-
tion of customary norms have been achieved (although without
absolute certainty).
The Exclusive Economic Zone, then, extends seaward to a dis-
tance not to exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured.44 Within this region a
Morin, Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles: A Persistent Problem, 10 CAUF. W. INT'L IJ.
514, 553 (1980).
37. Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 21-30 (articles 55-75).
38. "With or without a(n) (UNCLOS I) treaty it appears as if a 200 mile EEZ
will remain with us as part of customary international law." Morin, supra note 36,
at 533. 'There can be no serious question remaining that insofar as resources are
concerned, coastal-state exclusive authority extends beyond the territorial sea to a
limit of 200 nautical miles," Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones
and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 311 (1981).
39. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LMiTs IN THE SEAS
(No. 36, 4th rev. 1981).
40. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (b), 59 Stat. 1055, 993
U.N.T.S. 25 (1945).
41. I.C.T. REPORTS 3 (1969).
42. See Arrow, The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed 9 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 1 (1981), also, Hudson, Fishery and Economic Zones as Customary
International Law, 17 SAN DiEGo L REV. 661 (1980).
43. Morin, supra note 36.
44. For practical purposes the baselines represent the low-water line along the
coast except where special geographic obstacles exist. For the international rules
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coastal State "has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters .... ,,45 Thus, the effect of an EEZ would be
to include portions of the deep seabed outside the continental
shelf but within 200 nautical miles which otherwise would be
within the juridical definition of the high seas.46 A coastal State
which elects to declare an EEZ would be free to mine the deep
seabed for hard minerals to a distance of 200 nautical miles sea-
ward of its coastline. It would not be subject to either the reve-
nue-sharing provisions or the commercial recovery moratorium47
incorporated in the Draft Convention and the 1970 United Nations
Declaration of Principles Resolution,48 respectively.
The Regulations prohibit the commercial recovery of deep sea-
bed hard minerals from any portion of the deep seabed lying
outside the continental shelf or where foreign marine resource
zones recognized by the United States exist. The reasoning be-
hind utilizing this global definition of the deep seabed is that the
legal status of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national juris-
diction accounts for the only major unresolved issue at UNCLOS
II. Additionally, as the United States has no sovereign claims to
any portion of the deep seabed, the only solution was to broaden
the definition to exclude the possibility of allowing United States
citizens to begin commercial mining activities.
THE NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION
As mentioned earlier, the Act has failed to promote the contin-
ued development of deep seabed mining technology as the uncer-
tain legal nature of the deep seabed has forced the industry to
halt continued funding. No mining company will begin to con-
that apply, see Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done April
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Draft Convention, supra
note 16, at 3 (pt. II, arts. 2-15).
45. Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 21, (art. 56 (1) (a)).
46. Convention on the High Seas, done April 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, TLA.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 35 (pt. V, arts. 86-
120).
47. "All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the resources
of the area and other related activities shall be governed by the international re-
gime to be established." Declaration of Principles, supra note 11, para. 4.
48. Id.
sider allocating the hundreds of millions of dollars49 necessary to
develop a system to recover minerals from any submarine area
unless its ability to secure guaranteed access to those areas is
completely certain. In this regard, the very existence of the Act
should be questioned as its objective of securing access to seabed
minerals for the promotion of the industry will only be achieved
through the successful negotiation of Part XI50 of the Draft Con-
vention at UNCLOS Ill. Given that a majority of States5 ' have
agreed that the deep seabed lying outside the limits of national
jurisdiction should be the "common heritage of mankind,"52 no
company could expect to convince its stockholders that its inter-
ests could be protected by a single nation's legislative authority.
The right to mine the deep seabed must be conferred upon those
nations that have the technical and financial means to do so by
the entire community of nations. A reciprocating State regime
composed of the handful of deep seabed mining nations5 3 has no
better chance of circumventing the global character of the deep
seabed than do the municipal efforts of an individual State.
What is of critical importance to the industry, then, is the loca-
tion of an area where the authority to test and prove their designs
is undisputable. Testing and proving technology refers to the suc-
cessful demonstration of commercial capabilities and not simply
exploratory work which may be undertaken over any portion of
the deep seabed under the high seas freedom of marine scientific
research.54 Ore-grade nodules of commercial abundance lie only
on the deep seabed;55 and as the Regulations prohibit the com-
49. HoUSE Comm. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 13.
50. Pt. XI, entitled "The Area", is that portion of the Draft Convention that es-
tablishes the international framework for the management of deep seabed mining
outside the limits of national jurisdiction. Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 49(arts. 133-191).
51. Within the U.N. General Assembly, voting on the relevant resolution (see
Declaration of Principles, supra note 11) was completely unobjectionable as it
passed 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions (The United States voted in favor of the
Resolution).
52. The origin of the phrase "common heritage of mankind" is attributed to
Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta when he used it in a historical speech before
the U.N. General Assembly in 1967. Verbal note from the Permanent Mission to
the United Nations Secretary-General, dated August 17, 1967, circulated as U.N.
Doc. A/6695 (1967).
53. Those nations include the following:. United Kingdom, France, Belgium,
Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Japan, and Italy.
54. Although not specifically mentioned within article 2 of the Convention on
the High Seas, supra note 46, the freedom of marine scientific research is well rec-
ognized and is included within the inter alia freedoms referred to in the article.
Also, art. 87(f) of the Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 35, includes scientific re-
search in its enumeration of high seas freedoms.
55. Nodule samples taken from every ocean seem to indicate that the deposits
of greatest commercial interest, those with the highest concentrations of nickel
and copper, lie at depths as great as 6000 meters and southeast of the Hawaiian
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mercial recovery of hard minerals from the entire deep ocean
floor, it would seem as though the Act has created a completely
self-defeating situation. Clearly, under current principles of inter-
national law, the United States has the means of including vast
areas of the deep seabed within the jurisdiction of the Regula-
tions. For instance, the 1976 Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act granted exclusive control to the United States over all
living resources found within 200 nautical miles5 6 Also, the 1945
Truman Proclamation extended the jurisdiction of the United
States to all adjacent submarine areas of the continental shelf.57
To date, the United States, through the enactment of numerous
public laws, 8 has jurisdiction or control over all living and non-
living resources5 9 within 200 nautical miles except the hard min-
eral resources lying on and beneath the deep seabed outside the
continental shell. Congress declared there was a need to promote
an industry to recover strategic hard minerals 60 from the deep
seabed through the introduction and passage of the Act. The cre-
ation of an Exclusive Economic Zone would have granted United
States nationals the right to mine vast areas of the deep seabed
with potential economic value. When the magnitude of new met-
alliferous deposits found off the coasts ofthe states of Oregon and
Washington 61 is considered, one is quick to realize the need for
declaring exclusive control over the mineral resources of the deep
seabed within an EEZ. Studies have shown that the nodule de-
posits of greatest economic value lie directly southeast of the Ha-
waiian Islands, partially within a distance of 200 nautical miles.62
Islands between two seafloor fracture zones; the Clarion and Clipperton. Marjo-
ram, supra note 4, at 46-47.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. IV 1980).
57. Proclamation No. 2667, [1945] DEP'T STATE BULL. 484-87, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
See supra note 39, at 164. For practical purposes, this extended only to the 200
meter isobath.
58. For a general overview of all the United States Laws pertaining to the uses
of ocean space within the limits of United States jurisdiction, see U.S. DEPARTMtENT
OF COMNERCE, U.S. OCEAN PoLcxYn THE 1970s: STATus AND IssuEs, (1978) [GPO
No. 003-017-00427-9].
59. A possible exception is ocean thermal energy because the right to extract
this relatively new resource has yet to achieve international recognition. But see
Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 21 (art. 56 (1) (a)).
60. Those minerals upon which the United States is critically dependent for
the maintenance of defense and which are imported as a high percentage of do-
mestic use have been labeled as strategic by the White House.
61. 23 OCEAN SCL NEws 48 (1981).
62. Supra note 4. See also FERROmANGANESE DEPosrrs ON THE OCEAN FLooR,
(Horn ed. 1974) NAT'L SCL FOUNDATION.
In terms of reciprocity, it would seem obvious that, as more na-
tions begin to claim an EEZ, a United States claim to all re-
sources within 200 nautical miles becomes an even greater
necessity. Additionally, a United States claim to an EEZ would
solidify this new regime's place within the rules of customary in-
ternational law.
CONCLUSION
As the dependence on foreign sources for the principal mineral
constituents63 of manganese nodules by the United States contin-
ues to grow, there is an obvious need to foster the development of
deep seabed mining technology. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act failed in this objective by not granting United
States nationals access to any portion of the deep ocean floor.
Under current and emerging principles of international law, the
United States has an unopposable right to all resources within 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is
measured. As the United States has repeatedly claimed64 that
deep seabed mining is a freedom guaranteed by the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 65 it is confusing that the Regula-
tions refused to allow the commercial recovery of minerals from
the deep seabed prior to January 1, 1988.66
As deep seabed mining was, and is, part of a package treaty67
still in the process of negotiaton at UNCLOS Ill, it is understand-
able why United States legislators would have been reluctant to
grant United States nationals the right to mine the entire ocean
floor outside the limits of national jurisdiction. What is not under-
standable is that the drafters of the Regulations not only denied
United States nationals access to deep seabed minerals within an
area of unopposable jurisdiction, but further, they chose to incor-
porate the completely ambiguous language of the 1958 Geneva
63. Although nodules are composed of many different mineral constituents,
those of greatest abundance and, consequently, commercial interest are manga-
nese, copper, nickel and cobalt. See supra note 4, at 47.
64. See 30 U.S.C. § 1401, (1980) "[I]t is the legal opinion of the United States
that exploration for and commercial recovery of hard minerals of the deep seabed
are freedoms of the high seas ......
65. This Convention, while binding those States who became parties to it, is
also binding upon all States as the preamble indicates, "the following provisions
[are] generally declaratory of established principles of international law..." see
supra note 46.
66. 'qe Administrator (NOAA) may not issue.., any permit which autho-
rizes commercial recovery to commence before January 1, 1988.... ." See 30
U.S.C. § 1412 (1980).
67. UNCLOS III Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.2. See aso
Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 1 (Preamble), "the problems of ocean space
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole .. "
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Convention on the Continental Shelf.68 Legislation creating the
legal basis for a United States EEZ would have circumvented
both of these problems.
Should it be clear that UNCLOS H would fail to achieve a text
acceptable to the United States, then the introduction of addi-
tional reciprocal legislation granting rights for the commercial re-
covery of hard minerals from the Area would prove legitimate and
necessary. The negotiation of a reciprocating State regime, while
UNCLOS I continues to be the optimal means of achieving or-
dered cooperation by the community of nations over the uses of
ocean space, is an obvious violation of the principle of good
faith.69 This is especially true in light of the fact that all of the
reciprocating States70 are parties to the United Nations Declara-
tion of Principles Resolution which states, "All activities regard-
ing the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area
and other related activities shall be governed by the international
regime to be established."71 The negotiation and subsequent en-
try into force of a mini-treaty by nations who have previously
agreed to commit themselves to the lawmaking efforts of UN-
CLOS III would amount to a serious breach of comity and, more
significantly, international agreement. This is but another exam-
ple of the Act's shortcomings as it calls for the Administrator of
NOAA to seek such a regime.72
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act has not only
failed in achieving its primary objective, the continued develop-
ment of seabed mining technology, but it has also created difficul-
ties for the continued development and codification of
international law of the sea.73 It is now clear that the establish-
ment of a United States Exclusive Economic Zone is not only le-
gitimate, but very necessary as recent and previous discoveries of
valuable deep seabed deposits lying within 200 nautical miles
68. See supra note 27.
69. "One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of le-
gal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith" Nuclear Test
Cases, I.C.J. REPORTS paras. 43 & 46 (Australia v. France) (1974). See also Hassan,
Good Faith in the Process of Treaty Formation, 21 VA. J. INT'L I 443 (1981).
70. See supra note 53.
71. See supra note 47.
72. ' he Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
heads of other appropriate departments and agencies, may designate any foreign
nation as a reciprocating state.... ." See 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (1980).
73. See A Treaty in Trouble, Tnm, March 23, 1981, at 12.
from the United States coastline might very well prove to be of
significant economic concern. Clearly, the deep seabed and sub-
soil adjacent to the shores of the United States will only grow in
significance as land-based reserves of critical industrial minerals
continue to dwindle. One can only hope that United States legis-
lators will have the foresight to enact legislation which will pro-
mote the efficient continued development of deep seabed mining
technology through the creation of a United States Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone. The future of the United States deep seabed mining
industry may very well depend upon it.
